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THEEFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
WHEN iT REALLY BITES: A
REEXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE
FROM PUERTO RICO
ABSTRACT
This paper reinvestigates the evidence on the impact of the minimum wage on
employment in Puerto Rico. The strongest evidence that the minimum wage had a negative
effect on employment comes from an aggregate time series analysis. The weakest evidence
comes from cross-industry analyses. The main finding of the paper, however, is that the






and NBERThe neoclassical model makes clear predictions about the impact of a binding
minimum wage. Sectors that are forced to raise wages in response to a minimum should
reduce employment because of both substitution and scale effects. In addition, firms will
try to avoid the impact of a wage floor by reducing fringe benefits, not complying with the
law, charging "key fees, etc. When permitted by law, a subminimum wage should be used
by any firm that previously hired eligible workers at a wage below the minimum wage.
Although this model of the minimum wage is presented in almost every introductory
economics textbook, much recent research challenges these predictions.' Consider the
following findings:
1. Time-series regression models that have traditionally been used to measure the impact of
the minimum wage on teenage employment in the U.S. no longer fmd a statistically
significant effect of the minimum wage when data from the 1980s are added (see
Wellington (1991) and Kierman (1991)). The results are even more puzzling for nonwhite
workers, who have lower wages and would thus be expected to incur more disemployment
as a result of minimum wage hikes. Estimating the same specifications that wereestimated
in the past, Wellington finds a positive (but insignificant) relationship between the
employment rate of nonwhite teenagers and the coverage-weighted minimum wage.
2. Case studies of the fast food industry in Texas, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Jersey
and Pennsylvania find that employment did not decline at establishments that were forced
'Not all of the recent empirical literature finds anomalous results, however. For example,
see Taylor and Kim (1993).2
toraise wages by the minimum compared to others that were not (Katz and Krueger (1992),
Card and Krueger (1994), and Spriggs et a!. (1992)). If anything, these studies find that
employment increased in restaurants that were forced to raise their wages to meet the new
minimum wage in the short run. Card (1992) reaches a similar conclusion in a cross-state
study of the relationship between the teenage employment rate and the fraction of the work
force affected by minimum wage increases.
3. A cross-industry study of employment growth and minimum wage changes in the U.K.
(where industry councils set minima) by Machen and Manning (1994) concludes that the
minimum wage has not had an adverse impact on employment. If anything, employment
groWTh is positively related to minimum wage growth in this study, although the effect is
statistically insignificant.
4. Several studies have found that youth subminimum wages are hardly ever used by
employers in the U.S. For example, Katz and Krueger (1992) find that less than 5% of
Texas fast food restaurants used the youth subminimum wage in 1991. (See also Freeman,
et a!. (1981), Spriggs, et a!. (1992), and BNA (1993)).
5. There is a sizable spike in the wage distribution at the minimum wage. Brown (1988)
notes that the spike is an indication that people with presumably different ability levels earn
the same wage, at variance with the assumptions of the standard model. Perhaps even more
puzzling, there is a spike in the wage distribution at the minimum wage even for firms that3
are exempt from the minimum wage (Fritsch (1981)).
In spite of these anomalous findings for the U.S., it often is argued that when the
minimum wage really bites into the wage distribution --whenit far exceeds the equilibrium
wage for a substantial fraction of the work force --thenthe effects of the minimum
predicted by the textbook model will surface. The most commonly cited case where the
minimum wage really should, and does, matter is in Puerto Rico. Reynolds and Gregory
(1965) and Castillo-Freeman (1992) provide analyses of the minimum wage in Puerto Rico.
Their research is widely cited as supporting the predictions of the standard model in the
case when the minimum wage really matters (e.g., Fleisher (1970), Hamermesh and Rees
(1993) and Ehrenberg and Smith (1994)).
How can these diverse findings for the U.S. and Puerto Rico be reconciled? I see
three possibilities. 1) The recent wave of studies that conclude the minimum wage has not
had an adverse impact on employment are somehow wrong, perhaps biased by misspecified
equations, unobserved product demand shocks, and the like. The textbook modelis
everywhere and always true. 2) The minimum wage has the predicted effectswhen it is
really high relative to the equilibrium wage, but it has little effect when it islow relative to
the equilibrium wage. In other words, the textbook model only "works" when we have a
"really big" distortion. At U.S. levels, we need to expand our model of thelabor market to
include features like job search, dynamic monopsony, equity, X-inefficiency, and efficiency
wages to capture the anomalous results. 3) There is something wrongwith the evidence
from Puerto Rico. Even in an economy where the minimum wage really bites, the4
predictionsof the textbook model may not hold.
This paper reexamines the evidence on Puerto Rico, starting with Lloyd Reynolds
and Peter Gregory's classic 1965 study. Although Reynolds and Gregory have been
frequently cited as support for the standard model of the minimum wage, their evidence on
the employment effect of minimum wages is surprisingly mixed. Moreover, Reynolds and
Gregory conclude that minimum wage increases in Puerto Rico often brought about large
efficiency improvements in companies with the same capital and labor. Castillo-Freeman
and Freeman provide a more modern analysis of Puerto Rico's experience. A reanalysis of
their aggregate time-series data provide support for a disemployment effect of the 1974
minimum wage increase in Puerto Rico, but there is no evidence that the 1966-67 increase
in the minimum of comparable magnitude, or the 1968-73 decrease in the minimum, had
any discernable effect on employment. Perhaps more significantly, the cross-industry panel
analysis of Castillo-Freeman and Freeman is found to be extremely sensitive to plausible,
minor changes in specification. Indeed, just estimating Castillo-Freeman and Freeman's
specification by weighted least squares (WLS), instead of ordinary least squares (OLS),
changes the sign of the minimum wage variable. The basic conclusion of this paper is that
the evidence on minimum wage effects stemming from Puerto Rico is quite fragile.
I. The History of Minimum Wages in Puerto Rico2
The institutions determining Puerto Rico's minimum wage rate are governed by the
material borrows heavily from Reynolds and Gregory (1965) and Castillo-Freeman
and Freeman (1992).5
U.S. Congress. When the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) took effect in 1938, it initially
applied to Puerto Rico as well. Employers in Puerto Rico were required bylaw to pay the
U.S. minimum wage of 25 cents per hour, which exceeded average wages on the island by
perhaps 100%. Noncompliance with the minimum wage was widespread,and a number of
businesses threatened to close if the minimum wage was enforced. Congress recognized the
problems of enforcing such a high minimum wage in Puerto Rico,and passed an
amendment to the FLSA in June of 1940 that established tripartite industry committees to
set separate minimum wages at the industry and occupation level.Between 1940 and 1974,
amendments to the FLSA expanded coverage to new industries in Puerto Rico, but industry
committees continued to determine minimum wage rates.
The tripartite industry committees were composed of representatives of industry,
labor and the public, drawn from both Puerto Rico and the mainland. Eachcommittee
made recommendations to the Administrator of the Wage and Hours Divisionof the U.S.
Department of Labor, who was authorized to accept thecommittee's recommendations or
appoint another committee to rehear the case. The firstcommittees set minimum rates
around 20 cents, much lower than the mainland minimum, which by thenhad risen to 30
cents. Nevertheless, Reynolds and Gregory conclude that the industryminima led to a
substantial increase in hourly earnings in Puerto Rico.
Union leaders and some mainland employers charged that the PuertoRican tripartite
system did not raise minimum wages fast enough.In response to these criticisms, changes
in the mid 1950s reduced the Secretary of Labor's authority to interferewith Puerto Rican
minimum wages. In particular, tripartite committee recommendations were putinto place6
much quicker, which weakened employers' ability to appeal minimum wage increases.
Amendments to the FLSA in 1974 and 1977 introduced a new policy of increasing
coverage and enacting automatic increases in Puerto Rico's minimum wages to gradually
bring them in line with U.S. levels. By 1983, Puerto Rico effectively had the same
minimum wage as the U.S.
The minimum wage has had an overwhelming impact on the wage distribution in
Puerto Rico. According to Reynolds and Gregory, 46% of export industries with available
data employed at least half of their workers at exactly the minimum wage in 1955, and 75
percent of industries paid over half their workers within 5 cents of the minimum (see Table
2-4, p. 54). In 10 percent of industries, the average wage approximately equalled the
minimum wage. Reynolds and Gregory conclude "there are strong indications that the
minimum wage system has been partially responsible for the rapid increase in the real wage
level, the diverse movement of wages in individual industries, and the shrinkage of
occupational differentials" (p.80).
Castillo-Freeman and Freeman similarly document an impressive impact of the
minimum wage on the wage structure with Current Population Survey data. A large spike
in the Puerto Rican wage distribution at $2.90 is evident in 1979, when 50% of workers
were covered by the U.S. minimum of $2.90. Once all Puerto Rican industries became
covered by the U.S. minimum wage, the U.S. minimum wage became the modal wage paid
on the island. In 1983, one-quarter of Puerto Rican workers were paid within 5 cents of
the U.S. minimum wage of $3.35. In 1988, 28% of workers were paid within 5 cents of
$3.35 per hour, even though the average wage on the island rose in nominal dollars.7
Onemetric for comparing the impact of the minimum wage on the wage structure in
Puerto Rico is to compare it to the mainland. In the U.S. in 1989, 17 percent of teenage
workers earned within 5 cents of the minimum wage, of $3353 Thus, in the late 1980s
the minimum wage in Puerto Rico was more binding on the entire labor force in Puerto
Rico than it vas on the teenage labor market in the U.S.
II. What Did Reynolds and Gregory Actually Find?
Reynolds and Gregory's classic work on Puerto Rico is often cited as evidence that
the minimum wage had dire consequences for Puerto Rican employment. This
interpretation is somewhat ironic because Reynolds and Gregory reach a decidedly mixed
conclusion about the impact of the minimum wage in Puerto Rico.
Reynolds and Gregory provide three pieces of evidence on the impact of minimum
wages on employment in Puerto Rico, two of which have been largely ignoredin the
subsequent literature. First, they find a positive but insignificant correlation (r=.151)
between changes in production worker average wages and changes in employment across
36 Puerto Rican manufacturing industries between 1954 and 1958. Given that Reynolds
and Gregory attribute industrial wage growth in Puerto Rico largely to minimum wage
increases, this finding is inconsistent with the expected adverse employment effect of
minimum wages. However, Reynolds and Gregory argue that this positive correlation
"reflects the fact that the minimum wage setting procedure tends to push wages up fastest
in the most profitable industries, which are also, those experiencing a rapid rightwardshift
3See Katz and Krueger (1990).8
ofdemand schedules and, therefore, the largest expansion in employment" (p. 96).
The second piece of evidence presented by Reynolds and Gregory involves the
estimation of an employment demand equation. This evidence may appear primitive by
modern econometric standards, but it has proven to be the most influential aspect of
Reynolds and Gregory's work. Specifically, Reynolds and Gregory estimate the following
equation by OLS:
(1)______ - ______ =a÷b dW
(x0-'-X1) .(N0+N1)
whereX represents value added in the industry, N represents employment of production
workers, and W represents the production worker annual wage bill divided by the number
of production workers (N). The justification for the particular form of the dependent
variable is that labor demand may have shifted in some industries. Under the assumption
of constant returns to scale, one could subtract off growth in output to estimate the
substitution effect of wage changes holding output constant. Physical output is not
available, so value added is used instead. Value added in manufacturing industries equals
payroll pius profit plus capital payments. The negative of b is interpreted as an estimate of
the elasticity of substitution between labor and all other factors. The equation is estimated
with cross-industry manufacturing data for each of two periods, 1949-54andl954-58.
Reynolds and Gregory were aware of several conceptual problems with this
approach, and warn that their "findings must be interpreted with caution" (p.101).
4Thirty-seven industries were included in the earlier period, and 50 in the latter.9
Importantly,they note that increasing returns may be a more natural assumption in their
sample period. They also note that the assumption of a stable productionfunction excludes
technical progress. They were keenly aware that by holding output constant, they only
estimated the substitution effect, and that minimum wages may have scale effects as well.
Reynolds and Gregory ignore important statistical limitations of their approach.
Most importantly, industrial value added is largely accounted for by payroll; this is
especially true in a labor-intensive economy like Puerto Rico in the1950s. As a
consequence, since they have growth in payroll perworker on the right hand side of the
equation, and growth in value added (approximately payroll) minus growthin workers on
the left hand side, the coefficient b will naturally be biased toward 1. The bias willbe
greater if profits and capital payments are small, or are aconstant proportion of an
industry's payroll over time.
This bias can most easily be seen in the logarithmic version of equation (1):
(2) ln(X11X0) -ln(N1/N0)=a+bln(W1/W0).
Recall that X equals payroll (WN) plus profit (denoted it)pluscapital payments (denoted r),
X=WN +r+it. Takinga second-order Taylor series expansion of ln(WN+r+it) around
WN shows that the log of value added approximately equals ln(WN)+(r+it)/WN-
(r-f-it)2/2(WN)2.If r and itaresmall relative to payroll, the left hand side of equation (2)is10
approximatelyln(W1/W0). Regressing ln(W1/W0) on ln(W1/W0) will naturally bias b
toward 1.
Another source of bias in estimating equation (1) is that employment is likely to be
measured with error, so dividing payroll by employment to derive wages will also induce a
bias in b toward l. Current econometric practice probably would be to instrument for
wage growth (using either the lagged wage or the change in the minimum wage) to
overcome these biases. Unfortunately, Reynolds and Gregory do not present the underlying
data that would permit the calculation of such alternate estimates.
Reynolds and Gregory's estimate of the labor demand elasticity is insignificantly
different from -1. In 1949-54 their estimated elasticity is -1.1, and in 1954-58 it is -.92,
with standard errors of .13and .2l. Whether these estimates represent an output-constant
demand elasticity is open to some question, however. In addition to the likely statistical
biases noted above, one could question whether the (output-constant) labor demand
elasticity is as large as -1. First, most of the studies in Hamermesh's (1993) survey of
labor demand find the substitution elasticity to be less than -1. Second, a coefficient of -
impliesthat half of manufacturing production workers were displaced by wage increases in
Puerto Rico in the 1950s.8 Since the unemployment rate declined from 15.4% to 14.2%
SEven if (r+it)/WN is large, as long as it is constant within industries over time then first
differencing will cancel out this term and its square, inducing a bias toward 1.
6Since employment appears on the left hand side, any omitted variables will induce a
bias toward 1 because employment is in the denominator of the right hand side. Again, this
ct most readily be seen with the log approximation to equation (1).
7The estimates of the intercept, a, are close to 0, and not statistically significant.
3And this is an underestimate because it ignores the scale effect.11
between1950 and 1958, it seems unlikely that the labor market was flooded by a new wave
of thsplaced workers in this period. My own opinion is that the estimate is probably
severely biased toward -1, and that the exercise provides little evidence on the impact of the
Puerto Rican minimum wage on employment.
The third component of Reynolds and Gregory's evidence consisted of a detailed
study of the foundation garment industiy. This was an important industry in Puerto Rico.
Reynolds and Gregory devoted particular attention to the brassiere industry because this
industry was large (accounting for one quarter of total U.S. production), and because
brassieres were assembled by low skill workers and "not as susceptible to wide styling
changes."
The minimum wage in the corset, brassiere and allied garments industry increased
from 24 cents in 1950, to 33 cents in 1951, to 55 cents in 1954, to 86 cents in 1960, and to
99 cents in 1961 --overa 400 percent increase. Average wages in the industry closely
tracked the minimum wage, increasing from 29 cents in 1950 to 93 cents in 1960.
Remarkably, production worker employment in the foundation garment industry increased
nearly ten fold between 1951 and 1961 --from730 to 7,210. This pattern of employment
growth is clearly at variance with an adverse employment effect of the minimum wage.
Moreover, it is hard to argue that a product demand shock caused employment to rise
because the product price f.iJbetween1951 and 1961. A product demand shock would
be expected to affect employment via a rise in the price of output.
9The price per dozen units of garments shipped in Puerto Rico fell from $8.48 in 1951 to
$7.23 in 1961 (see Table 3A-1).12
How did the industry manage to adjust to such dramatic wage changes? Reynolds
and Gregory report, "The main lines of adjustment have been through a rapid rise in
productivity and a decline in profit margins" (p. 105). They document that dozens of
garments shipped per production worker increased 250% in the decade between 1951and
1961. They also document that operating profits as a percent of sales fell from 22 to 11
percent between 1953 and 1961. Thus, their explanation is a combination of productivity
shock effects and transfers from firms to workers.
Their careful field study of productivity responses to the minimum wage suggested
that turnover and absenteeism declined in response to minimum wage hikes, screening of
job applicants improved, and "managerial effort" improved. Reynolds and Gregory write
pointedly, "For the most part, these economies have not involved substitution of capital for
labor; they have involved mainly a substitution of managerial ingenuity plus a higher level
of effort by the supervisors and workers retained in the plant" (p. 193). They also note that
it is possible to raise "standards of expected output" when the minimum wage rises, which
in turn results in higher output per worker, "improved work flow and tighter supervision
and discipline." On the other hand, their evidence suggests that the sizable productivity
enhancements due to the minimum wage increases were not large enough to offset the
decline in profit rates. But these industries were earning extranormal profits to begin with
(compared to the mainland), so they continued to operate and even expanded employment.
Reynolds and Gregory's bottom line is decidedly mixed. They found some
regression evidence of capital-labor substitution in response to wage increases (subject to
the criticisms above), but their direct observations led them to conclude that productivity13
increasedin response to the minimum wage, and that key industries did not shrink despite
dramatic increases in the minimum wage. Their evidence did not support a purely
neoclassical interpretation or a purely institutional interpretation. In the end, Reynolds and
Gregory were quite reluctant to recommend changes in the minimum wage system in Puerto
Rico. They conclude, "In some Puerto Rico industries it may prove feasible to establish a
minimum wage identical with that on the mainland," while, "In other industries, a lower
Puerto Rican minimum may prove desirable" (p. 309).
III. Modern Analyses of the Puerto Rican Minimum Wage
Castillo-Freeman and Freeman's (1992) analysis of the Puerto Rican minimum wage
consists of two components: (1) an aggregate time series analysis, and (2) an industry-level
analysis. I consider each of these in turn.
A. Ag.gregate Time Series Analysis
Castillo-Freeman and Freeman analyze aggregate, annual time-series data for Puerto
Rico from l950l987.b0 They published the data in an appendix to their paper. Figure1
uses their data to construct a plot of the employment-to-population rateand the Kaitz
minimum wage index. The Kaitz index was constructed each year as:
f(m/w1)c1
10Santiago (1989) also presents an aggregate time-series analysis of theminimum wage in
Puerto Rico.
11Castillo-Freeman and Freeman report two series of the employment-to-populationratio.
Throughout this paper I use series A. The figure looks quite similarif series B is used instead.1.4
where f, is the fraction of employment in industry i, m1 is the minimum wage that applies to
industry i, v1 is the average hourly wage in industry i, and C,isthe fraction of workers in
industry i covered by the minimum wage)2 The Kaitz index has been widely used in U.S.
studies of the minimum wage.
Figure 1 displays some interesting patterns. First, notice that the "coverage-
weighted" minimum wage increased sharply in the 1966-67 period, but employment does
not display any noticeable break in trend. Furthermore, the 1968-73 decrease in the
minimum wage was not accompanied by (or followed by) a corresponding rise in
employment. The main support for a negative employment effect of the minimum wage
here is the 1974-75 minimum wage expansion period, which was accompanied by a discrete
decline in employment relative to population.
Table 1 presents an extension of the time-series regressions presented in Castillo-
Freeman and Freeman. Specifically, the log of the employment-to-population ratio is
regressed on the log of the Kaitz index, the log of Puerto Rican GNP, the log of US GNP,
a time trend, and corrected for a first-order autoregressive (AR(l)) term. Column (I)
presents a replication of Castillo-Freeman and Freeman's main estimates.14 The Kaitz
'2Castillo-Freeman and Freeman also use another measure of the minimum wage --the
average minimum dived by average hourly earnings times an economy-wide coverage measure.
Both minimum wage measures have a negative effect on employment, and the effect with the
Kaitz index tends to be larger in magnitude.
'3Notice, however, that this period also coincided with the first OPEC oil price shocks and
a sizeable recession in the mainland.
14Using the data published in Appendix A of Castillo-Freeman and Freeman I have been
able to exactly replicate the minimum wage elasticity they report in Table 6.3, column (1).
However, some of the other coefficients are slightly different, and the R-square in column (1)
is quite different. I estimated the models with the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure in STATA.15
index has a negative effect (-.15), and is statistically significant. I explored several
additional variants of this specification: omitting Puerto Rican GNP, including a quadratic
time trend, estimating the equation separately for the pre and post-1973 data, and
constructing a minimum wage index that does not involve coverage. Castillo-Freeman and
Freeman try a number of alternative specifications as well. In general, the results continued
to show a negative effect of the Kaitz index in these alternative specifications, although the
size and significance of the coefficients varied.
One may question the direction of causality of minimum wages in Puerto Rico,
however. Reynolds and Gregory, for example, were concerned that industry minima were
selectively raised in industries where employment was expected to grow. In adJition, one
might expect the minimum wage to matter with a time lag. To explore these issues, I
included the contemporaneous minimum wage index, two lags of the index, and two leads
of the index. These results are provided in column (2) of Table 1 and column (3) of Table
1 (without an autoregressive error correction). The leads of the minimum wage seem to
matter as much as the lagged and contemporaneous values. Since minimum wageincreases
took effect quickly after they were enacted, it is unlikely that expectations of minimum
wage increases caused employment to adjust in advance.
B. Cross-Industry/Time Series Analyses
The mainstay of Castillo-Freeman and Freeman's analysis is a cross-industry panel
data analysis of employment. Their approach is to use pooled crossindustry/time-serieS
data covering 42 industries from 1956-87 to estimate:1.6
(3) In(EMPIC)= a+ b in (cm,1/w) + T1 + IND +
where EMP,,isemployment in industry i in year t, c,m,/w,1 is the Kaitz index for industry i
in year t,Tis a row vector of year effects, IND1 is a row vector of industry effects, and
is an error term. Because unrestricted year and industry effects are included in this mode!,
the impact of the coverage-adjusted minimum wage is identified by varying patterns in the
minimum wage over time within industries. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman consider their
industry-level analysis "a stronger test of the hypothesis that the minimum affected
employment than thirty-one time-series observations' (p. 187).
Column I of Table 2 exactly replicates Castillo-Freeman and Freeman's basic
estimates for the post 1974 period. This specification shows a large, negative impact of the
minimum wage index on employment, with a t-ratio of -4.2. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman
suggest that the -.54 elasticity is likely to overstate the impact of the minimum on total
employment because workers will shift from industries with large minimum wage increases
to those with low increases.
Notice that the standard error of the regression in Column (1) is quite large for
industry-level data (.48), suggesting a substantial amount of sampling variability in the
dependent variable. Inspection of their data for selected industries revealed a huge amount
of variability from year to year which is most likely due to noise in the data. An example
of an industry with particularly noisy data is illustrated in Figure 2. The jagged pattern of
log employment changes are most likely due to sampling variability and other sources of
'5Their time-series regression actually has 37 observations.17
error.
A problem with estimating the specification in equation (3) by OLS is that the
outlying industries have high leverage, and due to sampling variability and the log
specification, smaller industries are likely to have much greater influence on the
regression.'6 Another problem is that the unweighted OLS estimates give far too much
weight to manufacturing industries, since Castillo-Freeman and Freeman's sample consists
of 37 detailed manufacturing industries and 5 one-digit non-manufacturing industries. In
1980, manufacturing only accounted for 19.7% of Puerto Rican employment.'7
To explore the robustness of the specification estimated by Castillo-Freeman and
Freeman, I tried two obvious alternatives. First, I estimated equation (3) by weighted least
squares, where the weights are the average industry employment overthe period 1956-87.
Second, I estimated equation (3) with the dependent variable in levels instead of logs.
The results of these exercises, which are reported in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1, are
dramatically different from the base specification in column (1). The minimum wage
coefficient becomes positive .07 if weighted least squares is used, with a t-ratio ofl.l.
What's more, when estimated in levels the employment effect of the minimum wage is
''The residuals from equation (2) are highly heteroskedastic. For example, I regressed the
squared residuals from equation (2) on the right hand side variables.The R2 from this
regression is .49, and the sample size times the R2 follows a fwith72 degrees of freedom.
In this case the x2stronglyrejects the null of homoskedasticity, with a value of 631.
'7See U.S. Department of Commerce (1984), p. 33.
'81n estimates not reported here, I used an alternative set of weights. Specifically, Ifirst
estimated equation (2) by OLS. The squared residuals from the estimated OLS equation were
then regressed on the explanatory variables. The square root of the predictedvalue from this
auxiliary regression provided the weights for equation (2). In this case,the coefficient on the
log Kaitz index became 1.9 with a t-ratio of 8.1.18
againpositive, now with a t-ratio of 6! This result is shown in column 3. It is not clear
which specification is to be preferred, but the disparate implications for the minimum wage
variable are troubling.
Castillo-Freeman and Freeman report separate estimates for the pre- and post-1973
period. They put more weight on the post-1973 period because beginning in 1974 the
Puerto Rican minimum wage was more closely linked to the U.S. minimum. My parallel
estimates for the post-1973 period are presented in Table 3. Castillo-Freeman and
Freeman's specification in column (1) shows a more negative effect of the minimum wage
in this subperiod. But when the log-log specification is estimated by WLS, the minimum
wage coefficient becomes slightly positive and statistically insignificant. The corresponding
weighted estimate for the pre-1974 period is also .03 (S.E..06). When the model is
estimated with employment measured in levels, the log of the Kaitz index has a negative
effect that is less than half as large as its standard error (t=.47). Also bear in mind that the
standard errors reported here and in Table 2 are probably an underestimate because no
attempt has been made to adjust for serial correlation in employment within industries.
These results do little to overturn the puzzling results found for the full sample reported in
Table 2.
Another specification check I tried involved including three leads, three lags, and the
contemporaneous Kaitz measure in equation (3). The unweighted log-log regressions
indicated that the lagged and contemporaneous Kaitz measures were jointly statistically
insignificant (p-value=.69). In fact, the three lags, contemporaneous value and two leads
were jointly insignificant (p-value=.21). Only the three-year-ahead Kaitz index was19
individuallystatistically significant in this regression. These results raise further questions
about the causal effect of minimum wages on Puerto Rican employment even in the
unweighted data.
Finally, I used Castillo-Freeman and Freeman's data to examine changes in
employment over the period that the Puerto Rican minimum wage became linked to the
U.S. level. Specifically, I split the data into three groups based on the 1973 Kaitz index:
the bottom 25 percent, the middle 50 percent, and the highest 25 percent. The bottom 25
percent is the most affected by the increase in the minimum wage, and the highest group is
the least affected. With this breakdown, I find the following percentage change in
employment for industries between 1974 and 1983:
Kaitz Index in Percentage Growth in Employment, 1974-83
1973: Mean Median
Lowest 25 percent -6% -22%
[Highest impact]
Middle 50 percent 6% -18%
Highest 25 Percent -36% -24%
[Lwest impact]
If anything, employment growth was greatest in the industries that should have been
most negatively impacted by the increase in the Puerto Rican minimum wage in the 1974-
83 period when the minimum was linked to the U.S. level. Notice, however, the large
difference between the median and the mean growth rate of industry employment. This
disparity is most likely a symptom of measurement error and sampling variance in the data.20
Nevertheless, these results provide little support for the conventional demand model.
C. A Conceptual Problem with the Cross-Industry Approach
How convincing should a cross-industry analysis be? Here I just want to highlight a
problem that arises in the cross-industry analysis if allindustries do not have the same
elasticity of labor demand.'9 Suppose there are two industries, denoted Aand B. Industry
A has an elasticity of demand for labor of -l and industry B has an elasticity of demand
of -.5. Suppose industry A is a higher wage industry than industry B. Now consider the
effect of a general minimum wage hike that raises wages by 5%inindustry A and by 10%
in industry B (because industry A is higher wage). The estimated effect of a minimum
wage increase on employment in this case would be zero --industryA and industry B
would both shrink by 5percent,even though they had different wage changes in response
to the minimum wage. This is only a contrived example, and one couldwork out an
example in which the employment effect of the minimum wage is biggerthan the elasticity
of demand in each sector (just reverse the elasticities of demand for industry A and B).
The point here is that the cross-industry studies rely heavily on the assumption that
the elasticity of demand is constant across sectors, an assumption unlikely tohold.2° A
similar problem arises in the time-series analyses; since industrial composition changes over
time one would not expect the aggregate economy to have the same elasticity of demand
over time. For these reasons, on methodological grounds I think oneshould have a
'9Note that this problem applies to Reynolds and Gregory's cross-industry study as well.
20lndeed, the fact that different weighting of the industries produces dramaticallydifferent
estimates in Tables 2 and 3 suggests the elasticity of demand varies across industries.21
preference for studies based on establishment-level data within-industries, where the
assumption of a constant elasticity of demand across establishments is more plausible. In
the future, it may prove very useful if such studies were conducted with Puerto Rican data.
IV. Garments and Related Industries --AnUpdate
Reynolds and Gregory paid particular attention to the garment industries. Here I
present a brief update of employment and wage trends in the textile, apparel and leather
industries. In terms of employment, the apparel industry was, and still is, Puerto Rico's
largest manufacturing industry, so any impact of the minimum wage on this industry would
be of great importance to the island. Table 4a presents employment in the textiles, apparel,
leather, and footwear industries in Puerto Rico in 1973, 1984 and 1992. Table 4b contains
wage data for the same period. For a point of comparison, the tables also present
employment and wages on the mainland U.S. in these same industries. The data are drawn
from the ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics.
Employment trends in these low-wage industries provides superficial support for the
conventional wisdom in PuertO Rico. Between 1973 and 1984, employment declined by 66
percent in textiles, by 19 percent in apparel, and by 41 percent in leather. The combined
employment in the four industries fell by 14,000 jobs between 1973 and 1984, which
amounts to 25 percent of the initial level. However, a similar pattern of employment
decline can be seen on the mainland for these same industries. For example, between 1973
and 1984, the combined employment in these industries on the mainland fell by 600,000
jobs, or 22 percent of the initial level. Between 1973 and 1992, employment in these22
industriesdeclined by more in the mainland than in Puerto Rico. The qualitatively similar
pattern of employment trends in these industries for PuertoRico and the mainland suggests
that factors other than the Puerto Rican minimum wage were at work.
Furthermore, the cross-industry pattern of employment and wage growth among
these four industries within Puerto Rico provides little support for the conventional view.
The lowest wage three-digit manufacturing industry in Puerto Rico in 1973 was the leather
industry, closely followed by footwear. These industries experienced the greatest wage
growth between 1973 and 1984 (both absolutely and relative to the mainland), probablyin
large part a result of linkage to the U.S. minimum wage. Yet the employmentdecline was
much greater in textiles, where the average hourly wage in 1973 was just below the U.S.
minimum of $2.00, than in these two low-wage industries. And the footwear industry
actually declined much more on the mainland than in Puerto Rico.
What explains the pattern of employment in the low-wage garment and related-
products industries? Industrial employment tends to go through a naturalevolution during
the course of development, with low-wage manufacturing jobs declining as a nation grows
in wealth. The most obvious explanation for the pattern of employment shown in Table 4a
is that Puerto Rico was undergoing rapid economic development in the 1970s and 1980s,
and the development process naturally entailed industrial shifts out of low-wage
manufacturing. These shifts in employment probably had little to do with theminimum
wage.23
V. Conclusion
This paper has reinvestigated the evidence on employment effects of Puerto Rico's
minimum wage. The strongest evidence that the minimum wage had a negative effect on
employment in Puerto Rico comes from an aggregate time series analysis. The weakest
evidence comes from cross-industry analyses. In general, however, I think one would have
to consider the evidence surprisingly fragile. If one asks oneself, would an intelligent
skeptic (say a sociologist) be persuaded of adverse employment effects of minimum wages
by the evidence from Puerto Rico, I think the honest answer would be: unlikely.
Perhaps the conclusion that one should reach from this review of evidence is that the
jury is still out on Puerto Rico's experience. In the meantime, it might make sense for
economists to contemplate alternative models that can, in some instances, account for the
limited, or even nonexistent, adverse employment effects of minimum wage increases.
Along these lines, three factors strike me as having been particularly relevant for Puerto
Rico. First, Reynolds and Gregory emphasize the inefficiency of production in Puerto Rico,
and that the minimum wage may have shocked employers into realizing efficiency
improvements. For example, consider the following passage from Reynolds (1965, p. 33)
AER summary of his research:
If one defines the production function as embodying median current practice,
one would have to say that the production possibilities frontier moved
outward as the wage level rose. If on the other hand one defmes the
production function in terms of best available techniques (say, in this case,
the performance of a superior mainland plant in the same industry), one
would have to say that most Puerto Rican plants started off well within their
production frontier and moved toward it as a result of wage pressure.24
If there waspervasiveslack in Puerto Rican industry, one might expect that
mainland employers could also improve production to lower costs in response to relatively
modest minimum wage increases without cutting the work force. Indeed, Gary Gerdemann,
a KFC spokesman recently said that his company has the ability to "engineer out" a one-
half percent cost increase by switching suppliers, reducing packaging, shipping materials in
bigger lots, and changing recipes.2' This slack seems to exist even after a recent
minimum wage hike. A major puzzle is why don't companies like KFCeliminatethis
slack even without the pressure of cost increases?
Second, massive disequilibrium strikes me as another possible consideration for
interpreting Puerto Rico's experience in the 1950s. Mainland employers were setting up in
Puerto Rico at a rapid rate. Wages in Puerto Rico were far below mainland levels, and
eployers made extranormal profits on the island. Modern and outdated production
technology were used at the same time; companies in the same industry earned a wide
range of returns on their investments. It is at least possible thatthe wage in Puerto Rico
was below its (temporary) equilibrium level. The minimum wage could have pushed wages
more quickly toward their equilibrium level. In this case, the minimum may have helped
the market to reach its ultimate equilibrium. Of course, this type of an explanation seems
far less applicable to the mainland.
Third, in many industries there were relative few employers in Puerto Rico. These
employers may have been able to monopsonize the labor market. For example, inthe
21See New York Tjrn. "Hardest Task of the 1990's: Raising Prices," March 1, 1994, p.
Dl.25
foundationgarment industry there were only 10 firms in 1953, and 18 in 1961 (see
Reynolds and Gregory, Table 3A-2). The low state of information and transportation
technology may have made monopsony more plausible.
At this stage, these are just speculations about Puerto Rico's experience. Indeed,
future research may well convincingly demonstrate that high minimum wages have resulted
in diminished employment in Puerto Rico. I think most economists, the current author
included, expect that at really high levels the minimum wage must reduce employment.
That this proposition has been so hard to show may be more a statement about the
difficulties of statistical analysis with available data, than about economic theory.26
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Figure 2: Employment Variability in Industry 6
year
56 87Table 1
Examination of Puerto Rico Minimum Wage Effects, 1951-87
Aggregate Time—Series Data
Dependent Variable: Log(Employment-to-Population Ratio)
Independent Var. (1) (2) (3)
Column 1 is a replication of the specification
6.3 of Castillo—Freeman and Freeman (1992).
observations in column 1, and 34 observations
AR(1) represents a first—order autoregressive
in column 1 of Table
Sample size is 37







































p—value of 2 leads
of Kaitz variables
.32 .18
R—Square .57 .87 .94
Root MSE .026 .022 .024Table 2
Examination of Puerto Rico Minimum Wage Effects, 1956-87
Pooled Cross-Industry/Time-Series Data
Dependent Variable and Model
Ln(Einp) Ln(Emp) Employment
Independent Var. Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Minimum x Covg./ —.54 .07 8177
Avg. Wage) (.13) (.06) (1359)
Industry Duniinies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Root MSE .48 .31 5918
R—Square .87 .96 .95
Column 1 is a replication of the specification in column 1 of Table
6.4 of Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992). Weights for column
(2) are average industry employment, 1956-87. Sample size is 1302
observations.Table 3











Ln(Minimum x Covg./ -.91 .03 -1148
(2445) Avg. Wage) (.24) (.19)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Root MSE .37 .20 3739
R—Square .95 .98 .99
Column 1 is a replication of the specification in column 3 ofTable
6.4 of Castillo—Freeman and Freeman (1992). weights forcolumn
(2) are average industry employment, 1956—87. Samplesize is 546
observations. Data for 1982 are excluded from the analysis because
the Survey of Manufacturers was not conducted in 1982.Table 4a
Employment in the Textile, Wearing Apparel, and Leather Industries
ISIC
Employment (l.000s) Percentage Change
1973 1984 1992 1973—841984—92 1973—92
Puerto Rico
Textiles 321 7.04 2.41 3.23 —65.8 34.0 —54.1
Apparel 322 38.44 31.08 28.76 —19.1 —7.5 —25.2
Leather 323 2,64 1.57 1.79 —40.5 14.0 —32.2
Footwear 324 3,64 3.56 3.7 —2.2 3.9 1.6
Total 51.76 38.62 37.48 —25.4 —3.0 —27.6
Textiles 321 1010 746
U.S.
678 —26.1 —9.1 —32.9
Apparel 322 1438 1185 1018 —17.6 —14.1 —29.2
Leather 323 101 66 52 —34.7 —21.2 —48.5
Footwear 324 183 124 71 —32.2 —42.7 —61.2











Textiles 321 1.94 4.31
Puerto Rico
5.04 122.2 16.9 159.8
Apparel 322 1.83 3.93 4.41 114.8 12.2 141.0
Leather 323 1.66 4.02 4.44 142.2 10.4 167.5
Footwear 324 1.71 3.97 4.73 132.2 19.1 176.6
Average 1.79 4.06 4.66 127.3 14.7 160.8
Textiles 321 2.95 6.46
U.S.
8.60 119.0 33.1 191.5
Apparel 322 2.76 5.55 6.95 101.1 25.2 151.8
Leather 323 2.79 5.71 7.40 104.7 29.6 165.2
Footwear 324 2.79 5.71 7.40 104.7 29.6 165.2
Average 2.82 5.86 7.59 107.5 29.5 168.8
Notes: Source is Yearbook of Labor Statistics (ILO:Geneva,Switzerland,
1983 and 1993), Tables 5 and 17. For the U.S., wages are only available
for leather and footwear combined.